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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 10-1381 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SHERMAN HOUSER, 
           Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 D.C. Criminal No. 08-cr-00759-001 
 (Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 January 14, 2011 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, BARRY and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed: 1/25/2011 ) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 After a jury trial, Sherman Houser was convicted of conspiracy to commit armed 
bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2113(d); and carrying and using a firearm during a crime of violence, in 
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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). On appeal, Houser argues the jury’s deliberations 
were unduly influenced by the trial court’s decision to provide it with a paper transcript 
of a conversation between Houser and one of his alleged collaborators. Because the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to use the transcript as a 
listening aid, we will affirm. 
I. 
 According to the evidence introduced at trial, Houser and Rondell Inman robbed 
the Bank of America on 14425 Bustleton Avenue in Philadelphia at gunpoint on 
November 6, 2006. After stealing over $70,000, the two fled in a stolen getaway car 
driven by Derrick Hutton. Inman entered into a plea agreement in which he pleaded 
guilty to robbing a Wachovia Bank in Ewing, New Jersey and admitted — but was not 
charged with — robbing three other banks, including the Bustleton Avenue Bank of 
America. Hutton also pleaded guilty to the Bank of America robbery. Both men testified 
at Houser’s trial, hoping their cooperation would yield leniency at future sentencing 
hearings.
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 In addition to eliciting the testimony of these two cooperating witnesses, the 
government established its case through footage from the bank’s surveillance camera and 
through the testimony of bank employees and witnesses whose accounts corroborated the 
getaway plan outlined by Houser’s confederates. One such witness, a construction worker 
completing a flooring project next to the bank, believed he had witnessed the end of a 
robbery, and he wrote down the license plate number of the getaway car. Law 
enforcement officials found the vehicle running and unoccupied in the parking lot of an 
apartment complex. A knit black skullcap was found on the ground by the passenger 
door, and analysis revealed Houser to be a major contributor to DNA found on the hat. 
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 As part of his efforts on the government’s behalf, Inman made a consensual 
recording of a conversation with Houser, in which the two discussed the government’s 
evidence in the Bank of America robbery and Hutton’s role as getaway driver. The audio 
recording was played at trial while television screens displayed an electronic transcript 
synchronized to the tape. Initially, the prosecutor asked for permission to pass out 
individual transcripts to the jurors. Houser’s counsel inspected the transcripts and offered, 
“No objection, Your Honor.” Subsequently, the prosecutor hesitated, first rescinding his 
request to circulate the transcripts then reverting to his initial request. The trial judge told 
the prosecutor to “hold off a little bit on that,” and defense counsel requested the 
transcript “not be shown until the tape is actually being played.” The District Court 
reiterated that “the transcript itself is really only an aid” and “not evidence.” The 
prosecutor then expressed concern that it might be comparatively difficult for the jurors 
to read the transcript on the screens and broached the possibility of playing the recording 
a second time for their benefit. 
 Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor asked the court for permission to play the tape 
again, this time after furnishing the jurors with individual transcripts. At a sidebar 
conference, defense counsel objected, arguing it would be unfairly prejudicial to allow 
the government to present the evidence twice. The prosecutor stressed the jurors’ right to 
have the transcript “as an aid” to help them process the dialogue. Defense counsel 
theorized that “if the jury were to come back during deliberations and say they need to 
have [the transcript], then we may have another issue at that time.” Once more 
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underscoring “the fact that what the evidence really is, is the audible evidence,” the 
District Court sustained defense counsel’s objection.  
 Prior to closing arguments, the prosecution moved its exhibits — including the 
audio conversation — into evidence. During deliberations, the jury requested a copy of 
the transcript. Defense counsel objected, arguing the paper transcript had not been 
admitted into evidence.
2
 The District Court reconvened the jury in the courtroom and 
allowed the government to play the tape of the conversation with the electronic transcript 
again displayed on the screen. Thereafter, the court allowed the jurors to have the paper 
copy of the transcript. First, however, the court cautioned, 
We do have a transcription of the conversation that is available; however, 
and it’s essentially the words, it is, in fact, a copy of the words you see on 
the screen. It’s available. It’s not evidence, only what you have heard is the 
evidence. And if there’s a discrepancy [between] what you see in writing, 
and what you hear, the words, then what you hear is what controls 
absolutely. The written word is not evidence, only what you hear and can 
hear is evidence, but as an aid to you and only as an aid, we do have a 
writing available. 
 
Houser does not argue the paper transcript was an inaccurate reproduction of the 
electronic transcript, which was twice put before the jury. 
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 Houser insists neither the video screen containing the typed transcript nor the paper 
copy of the transcript was admitted into evidence. The government contends the 
electronic transcript was admitted without objection. From the record, it appears as 
though Houser might be attempting to differentiate between the television screens as 
physical objects and the words displayed thereon — counsel appeared to acknowledge 
“what was on the computer screen” had been moved into evidence when objecting to the 
jury’s request. Regardless, because the jury was admonished to consider the paper 
transcript merely an aid to assist its understanding of the properly admitted audio 
recording, this evidentiary dispute is immaterial. 
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 The jury found Houser guilty on all counts, and the District Court sentenced him 
to 300 months’ imprisonment, a five-year term of supervised release, and payment of 
$70,194 in restitution. Houser timely appealed.
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II. 
 “[T]he standard of review for use of [a] transcript as a listening aid is an abuse of 
discretion.” United States v. DiSalvo, 34 F.3d 1204, 1220 (3d Cir. 1994). To make certain 
such an allowance falls within the proper exercise of its discretion, a trial court should 
“advise[ ] the jury as to the limited role to be served by the transcript” before 
deliberations. Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 847 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1988); see 
also DiSalvo, 34 F.3d at 1220 (“[T]he district court carefully warned the jury on several 
occasions that the transcript was not evidence.”); United States v. Ademaj, 170 F.3d 58, 
65 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Authenticated transcripts may be used by the jury to facilitate its 
understanding of the tape recordings themselves provided the court makes clear that the 
tapes, not the transcript, constitute evidence in the case.” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). Despite the District Court’s having taken great pains to instruct the 
jury on the primacy of the audio vis-à-vis the paper transcript, Houser nevertheless argues 
the jury room was tainted by the presence of items not admitted into evidence. See Gov’t 
of Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 685 F.2d 857, 863 (3d Cir. 1982).  
                                                 
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 In Martinez, we assessed a similar contention. See 847 F.2d at 128. There, the trial 
court refused to admit the transcript of an audio recording into evidence but allowed the 
jury to consult the transcript while the government played the tape. Id. Martinez argued 
this ruling was an abuse of the court’s discretion, but we found the transcript “did not 
introduce new evidence in addition to the tape recording.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, 
we approvingly cited cautionary instructions issued by the trial court that helped render 
the appellant’s claim “meritless.” Id. In relevant part, those instructions stated: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I am going to permit the tape. The tape is 
the evidence. And you are going to see a copy of what the Government says 
the tape says, but that is not evidence. That is just an assistance to you. And 
as soon as the tape is finished, [the clerk] will collect the transcripts. 
 
What you are going to be receiving are transcripts. And as I said, that is not 
evidence. The evidence is on the tape. If there is any dispute about what is 
in the transcript and what is on the tape, it is the tape that controls. 
 
Id. This language is strikingly similar to the instructions issued by the District Court here. 
The District Court took proper measures to ensure the jury’s verdict was not influenced 
by evidence not received during the trial. Therefore, its decision to allow the jury to view 
the paper transcript during deliberations was not an abuse of its discretion. See United 
States v. Pecora, 798 F.2d 614, 631 (3d Cir. 1986) (“We find nothing in the record to 
indicate that the jury relied improperly on the transcript or that the transcript contained 
inaccuracies that would substantially affect defendants’ rights in the event the jury had 
relied upon it.”). 
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III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
